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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Hospital  readmissions  receive  increasing  interest  from  policy  makers  because  reducing
unnecessary  readmissions  has  the potential  to  simultaneously  improve  quality  and  save
costs. This paper  reviews  readmission  policies  in Denmark,  England,  Germany  and  the
United  States  (Medicare  system).  The  suggested  roadmap  enables  researchers  and  policy
makers to  systematically  compare  and  analyse  readmission  policies.  We  ﬁnd  considerable
differences  across  countries.  In Germany,  the  readmission  policy  aims  to avoid  unintended
consequences  of the  introduction  of  DRG-based  payment;  it  focuses  on readmissions  of
individual  patients  and  hospitals  receive  only  one  DRG-based  payment  for both  the  initial
and the  re-admission.  In Denmark,  England  and  the  US  readmission  policies  aim  at  quality
improvement  and  focus  on  readmission  rates.  In Denmark,  readmission  rates  are  publicly
reported  but  payments  are  not  adjusted  in  relation  to  readmissions.  In England  and  the  US,
ﬁnancial incentives  penalise  hospitals  with  readmission  rates  above  a certain  benchmark.
In England,  this  benchmark  is  deﬁned  through  local  clinical  review,  while  it is based  on
the  risk-adjusted  national  average  in the US.  At  present,  not  enough  evidence  exists  to give
recommendations  on the optimal  design  of  readmission  policies.  The  roadmap  can  be  a
tool for  systematically  assessing  how  elements  of  other  countries’  readmission  policies  can
potentially  be adopted  to improve  national  policies.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under
the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Health care systems around the world are under
pressure to deliver value for money [1,2] with poli-
cymakers simultaneously aiming to control costs and
improve the quality of care. Reducing unnecessary hospi-
tal readmissions seems to be an attractive means to that
end, as fewer readmissions can potentially both reduce
costs and improve the quality of care [3,4]. In England,
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +45 65504234.
E-mail address: mbe@sam.sdu.dk (M.  Bech).
in 2011–2012 the 28 days emergency readmission rate
was  11.5% – an increase from 9% in 2002–2003 [5]. In the
United States (US), 16% of Medicare beneﬁciaries who were
discharged from hospital had an unplanned readmission
within 30 days in 2011 [6].
Hospital readmissions have been of interest to
researchers and policy makers since the late 1970s [7].
However, it is only relatively recently that policies were
developed in several countries with the speciﬁc aim of
reducing readmissions. Interest in the link between ﬁnan-
cial incentives and readmissions increased considerably
in the early 1980s, when DRG-based hospital payment
was  introduced in the United States [8]. Under DRG-based
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2014.12.009
0168-8510/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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payment, hospitals are paid a ﬁxed amount per admission,
with the amount depending on certain patient and treat-
ment characteristics [9]. Consequently, incentives were
introduced for hospitals to increase their income by admit-
ting more patients, and possibly to readmit patients as new
admissions for ﬁnancial reasons [10]. Therefore, at the time,
it was speculated that some readmissions might be “avoid-
able” under a different set of incentives [11–13]. Following
the introduction of DRG-based hospital payment systems
in most European countries [14], similar concerns emerged
(for example in Germany [15], England [16], and France
[17]).
Recent policy attempts to reduce readmission rates in
England and the United States (US) have in common a
reliance on ﬁnancial penalties. It is perhaps less well known
that Germany introduced similar ﬁnancial incentives for
hospitals to avoid readmissions more than 10 years ago.
In comparison, in Denmark, readmission rates are moni-
tored but there is no national policy concerning the use of
ﬁnancial incentives.
The use of ﬁnancial penalties to reduce readmission
rates has been met  with some resistance from the medical
communities in England and the US [18,19]. In the US, the
importance of risk adjustment, and which factors to include
in such adjustment has attracted particular attention, and
it has been highlighted that for example community char-
acteristics are likely to be important factors inﬂuencing
readmission rates [19–22].
The debate has also focused attention on the fact that
the speciﬁc incentives of different policies are decisive in
determining whether a policy is successful [3,23]. Recog-
nising the importance of different policy designs, a review
of current national policy approaches to dealing with read-
missions has the potential to provide valuable learning
and inspiration for future reform across countries currently
struggling with similar problems.
Currently, a systematic comparison of readmission poli-
cies across different countries is unavailable. This paper
aims to ﬁll this gap by providing and applying a roadmap for
systematically comparing readmission policies across four
high-income countries with different institutional settings:
Denmark, England, Germany and the United States (Medi-
care inpatient prospective payment system, IPPS). These
countries represent illustrative differences in dealing with
readmissions and are informative cases for demonstrat-
ing the use of our roadmap. We  begin by developing a
roadmap of policies distinguishing between policies for the
measurement and management of hospital readmissions.
Subsequently, we apply the roadmap to readmission poli-
cies in the selected countries, and lessons arising from the
comparison are discussed.
2. Methods: a roadmap for analyzing readmission
policies
We  gathered information and reviewed ofﬁcial docu-
ments and policy statements for relevant country-speciﬁc
laws and regulations for the countries included in the
study. The laws and regulations could be either speciﬁc
readmission policies or policies that indirectly inﬂuence
hospitals’ incentives to reduce readmissions. The policies
[24–27] were analysed in order to identify similarities and
differences across countries, and to identify characteristic
features of different policies.
Analysis of the identiﬁed policies led to the identiﬁca-
tion of two main dimensions of readmission policies: (1)
readmission measurement and (2) readmission manage-
ment (see Fig. 1). Policies can focus either on readmission
of individual patients or on readmission rates. The aim of
the policy and the intended audience determine the spe-
ciﬁc characteristics of how readmissions are measured and
how this information is used for readmission management.
2.1. Readmission measurement
2.1.1. Focus of readmission policies: individual patients
or readmission rates
Readmission policies can focus on measuring and man-
aging readmissions of individual patients or they can focus
on readmission rates. If the focus is on readmission rates, a
denominator and numerator must be deﬁned, and the level
at which rates are calculated must be chosen [28]. Depend-
ing on the aim and audience, this level could be the nation,
the region, the hospital or the hospital department.
A policy focussing on the readmission of individual
patients has the advantage that it directs the attention to
the question of how to avoid a speciﬁc readmission of an
individual patient or a speciﬁc group of patients. A focus on
readmission rates has the advantage that it enables bench-
marking of readmission rates across the chosen aggregate
units.
2.1.2. Deﬁnition of relevant readmissions
Independent of whether the focus is on individual
readmissions or aggregate readmission rates, readmission
measurement always requires a clear deﬁnition of what a
relevant readmission is: in generic terms, a readmission is a
second admission to a hospital within a speciﬁed period of
time after a primary or index admission. The readmission is
deﬁned by criteria for the initial admission, criteria for the
subsequent second admission, and the relevant time period
between the two admissions [29–31]. Both admissions can
be speciﬁed in terms of inclusion or exclusion criteria.
A relevant index- and second admission can be deﬁned
in terms of the patients’ clinical characteristics (e.g. the
diagnosis), demographic characteristics (e.g. age and gen-
der), the specialty where patients were treated, or the
admission type (e.g. emergency or elective admission).
These speciﬁcations can be the same or different for the
index and the second admission. For example, the def-
inition of relevant readmissions could specify that only
emergency admissions following an initial elective admis-
sion are to be included. If readmission rates are calculated,
the index admission deﬁnes the denominator population,
while the number of second admissions within the relevant
time period deﬁnes the numerator.
The time period has to be speciﬁed in order to determine
whether a second admission is to be considered a relevant
readmission and not just another primary admission. Time
can be measured from discharge of the index admission,
or from the ﬁrst day of the initial admission. The choice of
criteria for the index admission, the second admission, and
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Fig. 1. A roadmap for health system policies for hospital readmissions.
the time frame depend on the audience of the indicator and
the purpose of measuring readmissions.
2.2. System level readmission management
In general, the aim of measuring the number or the rate
of readmissions is to generate the necessary background
information for managing readmissions [29]. System level
readmission management involves the provision of system
level incentives to reduce readmissions. It is the intention
of such policies that they will generate incentives for reduc-
ing readmissions at a local level. This can be in the form of
changes to in-patient care such as introducing case man-
agers and improving discharge information, or in the form
of follow-up community care.
A non-ﬁnancial incentive is the publication or public
reporting of readmission rates, e.g. showing an individ-
ual hospital’s performance relative to other hospitals. This
can, in theory, reduce readmissions through two inter-
connected pathways, a selection pathway, where patients
select hospitals with lower readmissions (demand reac-
tion), and a change pathway, where hospitals reduce
readmissions because they ﬁnd themselves underperform-
ing [32–34].
Financial incentives may  include bonuses for “good”
performance, i.e. for reducing the number or the rate of
readmissions, or “penalties” for hospitals with higher num-
bers or rates of readmissions. Penalties can be in the form
of non-reimbursement for an individual readmission, a
reduction of reimbursement or even in the extreme case
no reimbursement and a penalty for the hospital.
In the case where ﬁnancial incentives are linked to
readmission rates and not to individual readmissions, a
performance benchmark has to be established against
which the hospital speciﬁc rate can be compared.
The performance benchmark can be absolute or rela-
tive to the individual provider’s performance in a previous
period (a local benchmark) or other providers’ performance
(a global benchmark). For example, an absolute bench-
mark can be set on the basis of expert opinion. A relative
benchmark might be deﬁned as performance below a cer-
tain quantile of the distribution. In addition, readmission
rates are usually risk-adjusted when they are compared
with the benchmark because rates have been found to
vary with a range of factors such as age, gender, co-
morbidities and treatment setting (inpatient or outpatient
care) [29,35–37].
3. Results: readmission policies in Denmark,
England, Germany, and the United States
3.1. Introduction, audience and aims of readmission
polices
Table 1 shows that readmission policies were
introduced relatively recently in all four countries.
England was the ﬁrst country to introduce measurement
of readmission rates and to make this information publicly
available in 2001. Denmark started measuring readmis-
sions in 2002 but introduced public reporting (initially for
35 types of surgery) only in 2006. In the US, public reporting
was  introduced for hospitals paid under the IPPS in 2010. In
Germany, the current readmission policy, which includes
the provision of ﬁnancial incentives, was introduced in
2004 together with the nationwide introduction of the
DRG-based hospital payment system (Table 1).
In all countries, information on readmissions is collected
to inform the payers and providers in the national hospital
care system. In addition, all countries except for Germany
make information on readmissions available to the pub-
lic. The stated aim of measuring readmissions varies from
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Table  1
Introduction, audiences and aims of readmission policies in Denmark, England, Germany, and the United States.
Country Introduction Audience Aim
Denmark Administrative measurement:
2002
Public reporting: 2006
Hospitals, regions,
municipalities, the public
To increase awareness of
variation in readmission rates
at all levels of the health care
system, support patients’ free
choice of hospital and for
public reporting
England Public reporting: 2001
Financial incentives: Apr-2011
The NHS and the public Public reporting: to monitor
success in avoiding (or
reducing to a minimum)
readmission following
discharge from hospital” [51]
Financial incentive: to reduce
the actual level of emergency
readmission into hospital by
making hospitals responsible
for patients for the 30 days
after discharge
Germany 2004 (with the country-wide
introduction of DRG-based
hospital payment)
The Institute for the Hospital
Reimbursement System (InEK)
acting on behalf of the
Association of Sickness Funds
(GKV), the Association of
Private Health Insurers (PKV)
and the German Hospital
Federation (DKG)
Avoiding unintended
consequences, i.e. increased
readmissions, resulting from
the introduction of the
DRG-based hospital payment
system [15]
USA (Medicare) Public reporting: 2010
Financial incentives: Oct-2012
Hospitals, policymakers, and
other stakeholders
Public reporting: to improve
health care quality, population
health, to reduce the costs of
health care, and to allow
hospitals, policymakers, and
other stakeholders to evaluate
the quality of care and to seek
improvements that will impact
patient well-being
Financial incentives: to
transform Medicare from a
passive payer to one that pays
not just for quantity of services
but for quality as well
aiming to increase the awareness of variation in readmis-
sion rates (Denmark), to an aim of using this awareness
to reduce avoidable readmissions (England, Germany, US),
which in the case of Germany is recognised as being a
potential unintended consequence embedded in a DRG-
based payment system, and in the case of the US explicitly
seen as a way of reducing costs and increasing quality.
3.2. Readmission measurement
3.2.1. Focus of readmission policies: the level at which
readmissions are measured
Table 2 shows that readmission policies focus on mea-
surement of readmissions at different levels. Denmark,
England, and the US measure readmissions rates at the
hospital level. Denmark and England also calculate read-
mission rates at various regional levels. In addition, all three
countries calculate condition-speciﬁc readmission rates for
a limited number of conditions, as well as all-cause read-
mission rates.
In Germany, by contrast, the readmission policy focuses
on the individual patient. A relevant readmission is
identiﬁed by the hospital (or the payer), when an individ-
ual patient is readmitted to the hospital. Subsequently, the
hospital has to merge the patient’s records from the two
admissions into a single ﬁle, and this becomes relevant for
reimbursement (see Section 3.3.1).
3.2.2. Deﬁnition of relevant readmissions
Table 2 also shows that Denmark, England, and
Germany consider readmissions for almost all conditions
to be relevant. In Germany, certain restrictions apply in so
far as only readmissions for the same reasons or for com-
plications of treatment are considered to be relevant. By
contrast, in the US, only readmissions for acute myocar-
dial infarction (AMI), heart failure (HF) and pneumonia (PN)
are covered under the current readmission policy, although
inclusion of three more conditions (chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, total hip arthroplasty and total knee
arthroplasty) is planned for 2015.
In Denmark, England and the US, the deﬁnition of
relevant readmissions excludes planned readmissions. In
England, only emergency readmissions are considered
to be relevant readmissions. The rationale for excluding
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Table 2
Readmission measurement in Denmark, England, Germany, and the United States.
Country Level at which
readmissions are measured
Deﬁnition of relevant readmissions
Deﬁning criteria Exceptions Time frame of
measurement
Denmark Hospital, municipality,
disease
All second acute
admissions in public and
private hospitals
The general indicators have
no exemptions, but
exemptions apply to within
disease speciﬁc indicators
30 days from discharge
England For publication purposes:
Strategic Health
Authorities, NHS Trusts,
Mental Health Trusts,
Government Ofﬁce
Regions, Primary Care
Organisations, Local
Authorities, Hospital
Trusts, Country, County,
Independent Sector Health
Care Providers, Primary
Care Trusts, Regions,
Gender and condition
For reimbursement
purposes:
Hospital Trust level
For publication purposes:
All cause readmission rate
and speciﬁc rates for:
fractured proximal femur,
hip replacement,
hysterectomy, stroke
For reimbursement
purposes:
Emergency admissions
after an emergency or
elective index admission.
For publication purposes:
– patients <16 years of age
For reimbursement
purposes:
– HRGs that do not have a
national tariff
–  Maternity and child birth
– Cancer, chemotherapy
and radiotherapy patients
–  Children under age 4
– Patients who  discharged
themselves against clinical
advice
– Emergency transfers
from another provider
–  Cross-border activity
–  Patients receiving renal
dialysis
– Transplant patients
For publication purposes:
28 days from discharge
For reimbursement
purposes:
30 days from discharge
Germany Individual patient (1) A second admissions for
the same reason (within
the same base-DRG)
(2) A second admission for
the same reason (within
same MDC) if the patient
was  ﬁrst a medical case
and is now treated with
signiﬁcant procedures (e.g.
surgery)
(3) A second admission for
complications of treatment
Exceptions are deﬁned at
the DRG level. Exempted
DRGs are indicated in the
DRG catalogue:
–  maternal and newborn
care
–  DRGs with ICU treatment
– certain cancer cases
(haematological cancer,
radiotherapy)
–  pain therapy
– renal dialysis
–  all pre-MDC DRGs
(including transplants)
– error DRGs (surgery
unrelated to the main
diagnosis)
→ about 23% of all DRGs
are exempted from the
policy
For (1) and (3) the relevant
time period is the upper
length of stay threshold of
the relevant DRG (counted
from the day of initial
admission). The threshold
depends on the speciﬁc
DRG. E.g. it is 4 days for the
DRG for certain
ophthalmological surgeries
and 70 days for the DRG for
craniotomy with
radiotherapy. For (2)
within 30 days from initial
admission
USA  (Medicare) For public reporting:
Hospital-Wide All-cause
and separately for AMI,
COPD, Hip/knee, HF, PN,
Stroke
For ﬁnancial incentives:
Hospital by condition (AMI,
HF, PN). From FY 2015 also
COPD; elective total hip
arthroplasty (THA) and
total knee arthroplasty
(TKA)
A second admission after
discharge from admission
for Acute Myocardial
Infarction (AMI) Heart
Failure (HF) or Pneumonia
(PN)
Planned readmissions
(obstetrical delivery,
transplant surgery,
maintenance
chemotherapy,
rehabilitation and
non-acute readmission for
a scheduled procedure)
30 days from discharge
planned readmissions is that these do not constitute poor
quality of care. In Germany, planned readmissions are also
covered by the policy. The objective is to avoid that hos-
pitals can artiﬁcially increase their revenue by splitting
one hospital stay into two admissions. For example, in the
absence of the readmission policy, it would be possible for
hospitals to bill two  DRGs if they discharge a patient after a
diagnostic procedure and subsequently readmit the patient
a few days later for surgery.
England, Germany, and the US exempt certain condi-
tions from the readmission policy. The exemptions always
include transplants, maternal and newborn care, cancers
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and chemotherapy as well as certain other cases that
vary depending on the country. For publication purposes,
England explicitly focuses on patients aged 16+, while
for reimbursement purposes, the focus is on patients
aged 4+. The US policy focuses on all Medicare patients,
which implicitly means all patients aged 65+. In Denmark,
most indicators do not exempt speciﬁc patient groups e.g.
deﬁned by age, but some indicators are presented for aged
65+ separately.
The time period during which a second admission is
considered to be a readmission is relatively similar in
Denmark, England and the US. In England, it is 28 days
for public reporting and 30 days for reimbursement pur-
poses, in both cases calculated from discharge. In Denmark
and the US it is 30 days from discharge. Germany is the
only country, where the time period is measured from ini-
tial admission, and where condition speciﬁc time periods
are used to identify a second admission as a readmission.
If a patient is readmitted for the same reason, i.e. in the
same base-DRG, or for complications of treatment, the time
period that determines whether a second admission is a
readmission is delimited by the DRG speciﬁc upper length
of stay (LOS) threshold. This threshold speciﬁes the number
of days for which hospitals receive the normal DRG tariff,
and it lies between 4 and 70 days depending on the DRG
(if patients stay longer, DRG speciﬁc per diem surcharges
apply). A second admission-taking place before the upper
LOS threshold is considered a readmission. An unspeciﬁc 30
day threshold applies only if a patient was initially treated
medically and is subsequently readmitted for the same rea-
son for surgery.
3.3. Readmission management
3.3.1. Incentive provision
Table 3 summarises information on incentives aiming
at reducing readmissions in the four countries included in
our study. Denmark, England and the US have implemented
public reporting of readmission rates with the aim of moti-
vating hospitals to reduce readmissions. In England raw
and risk adjusted readmission rates are published for all
causes aggregated, and individually for four conditions. In
Denmark, raw readmission rates are reported online for
an increasing number of surgical conditions. In the US,
an increasing number of condition speciﬁc readmission
rates have been published as part of the Hospital Inpa-
tient Quality Reporting (HIQR) Programme since 2010, and
the all-cause unplanned readmission rate was added to the
programme in 2013. Participating in the HIQR programme
is ﬁnancially encouraged (see Table 3).
Financial incentives to reduce readmissions exist in all
four countries but the speciﬁcities of these policies differ
greatly across countries. In Germany, the patient records
of the ﬁrst admission and the relevant readmission are
merged into a single case, and the hospital is paid as if there
had been only one admission. Consequently, the hospital
receives payment for only one DRG. However, this DRG is
determined on the basis of the merged data, i.e. all sec-
ondary diagnoses found or surgical procedures performed
during the second stay can lead to the reclassiﬁcation of the
patient into a DRG with an associated payment that might
be higher than what the hospital would have been paid for
the ﬁrst admission only. In addition, if the combined length
of stay of the ﬁrst admission and the readmission exceed
the DRG speciﬁc LOS threshold the hospital receives the
applicable per diem surcharges.
In England, the original policy introduced in 2011 was
similar to the German policy in that the NHS no longer
reimbursed any readmission occurring within 30 days from
discharge from an elective admission, although reclassiﬁ-
cation of patients on the basis of the readmission was  not
allowed. However, since April 2012, the non-payment pol-
icy is based on the hospital speciﬁc readmission rate, and
only applies to readmissions above a locally set benchmark
(see Section 3.3.2). In addition, as part of the English policy
to reduce the number of readmissions, the savings gener-
ated from withholding payment for readmissions, must be
reinvested by payers into post discharge reablement ser-
vices to prevent future readmissions.
In the US, hospitals paid under the Medicare IPPS with
higher than expected readmission rates for AMI, HF, and PN
are penalised by a percentage reduction of the hospital’s
DRG base rate of up to 2% (depending on the readmis-
sion performance of the hospital) in 2014. This reduction
has increased from 1% in 2013 and will increase to 3% in
2015. The reduction refers to the hospital’s DRG base oper-
ating payment, meaning that payments are reduced for all
patients admitted to the hospital for any reason and not
just for readmissions or the covered conditions.
In Denmark, there is no national policy to provide
explicit ﬁnancial incentives for reducing the number of
readmissions. However there are regional rules that do so
implicitly. Some regions reduce hospitals’ reimbursement
if a hospital’s intensity of treatment – measured as the sum
of the DRG value of the production divided by the total
number of patients treated at this hospital within a given
year – has increased by more than 1.5%. This indirectly
incentivises hospitals to avoid readmissions.
The feasibility of using ﬁnancial incentives for reducing
the number of readmissions may  differ depending on the
speciﬁc organisational structure and ﬁnancing of the health
care system.
3.3.2. Benchmark setting and risk-adjustment
In the US and England, where ﬁnancial incentives are
targeted at reducing ‘avoidable’ readmissions, a benchmark
is used to determine which proportion of all admissions
should be considered avoidable. In the US, readmission
rates of hospitals paid under the IPPS are compared to
a benchmark, which is the expected risk adjusted read-
mission rate for that hospital. The expected risk adjusted
readmission rate is calculated by taking into account the
hospital speciﬁc distribution of patients’ age, gender and
30–40 (depending on the indicator) clinical risk factors,
using data from the previous 3 ﬁnancial years.
In England, for the reimbursement policy, the bench-
mark is set during the ﬁrst three months of the year on the
basis of a detailed local clinical review of all readmissions
to each hospital occurring within a ﬁxed time period of at
least 1 week. The aim of the review is to determine the
avoidability of each readmission. The rate of unavoidable
readmissions determined during this review period is then
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Table 3
Readmission management in Denmark, England, Germany, and the United States.
Incentives Performance benchmark
Country Financial Non-ﬁnancial Deﬁnition Source of information Risk adjustment
Denmark Some types of
admissions are
reimbursed by block
grants, which
indirectly create an
incentive to decrease
no. of readmissions
Reporting in publicly
available quality
monitoring reports,
and public reporting
Hospital-speciﬁc risk
adjusted total and
disease-speciﬁc
readmission rates
National patient
register including all
hospitals admissions
Yes (age and gender)
England No reimbursement for
the proportion of
readmissions
considered to be
avoidable during
clinical review.
(Savings have to be
invested into post
discharge enablement
services and the
prevention of
readmission
-particularly in the
areas identiﬁed in the
clinical reviews.)
Public reporting of
hospital readmission
rates
Locally agreed level of
‘avoidable’
readmissions
Clinical review of
readmissions at each
hospital during a
period of at least 1
week (and up to 3
months) determines
the local level of
avoidable admissions.
For reimbursement not
applicable
For public reporting:
adjusted for age,
method of admission of
discharge spell,
diagnosis (ICD 10
chapter/selected
sub-chapters within
medical specialties)
and procedure (OPCS 4
chapter/selected
sub-chapters within
surgical specialties).
Germany Hospitals receive only
one DRG-based
payment (readmitted
cases are merged with
the ﬁrst admission for
reimbursement
purposes)
No public reporting Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
USA  (Medicare) For hospitals not
participating in public
reporting: reduction in
the market basket
update (an annual
inﬂation adjustment to
Medicare payments) of
initially 0.4% (from
2005) and from 2007
2%
For hospitals with
risk-adjusted
readmissions above
national average:
reduction of base
operating DRG
payments by up to 2%
(will increase to 3% in
2015)
Public reporting of
hospital readmission
rates
National average
condition-speciﬁc
readmission rate
National data for the
previous 3 years
Yes (patient
demographic
characteristics,
comorbidities, and
patient frailty)
used as a threshold readmission rate of acceptable readmis-
sions, beyond which the hospital will not be reimbursed for
its readmissions [26].
Contrary to the readmission rate used for reimburse-
ment purposes, the readmission indicator used for public
reporting in England is subject to risk adjustment.
In Denmark risk adjusted readmission rates are reported
publicly in websites, search engines and reports on hospital
performance.
4. Discussion
This is the ﬁrst study to systematically assess hospi-
tal readmission policies across four countries. The results
show that policies differ considerably: in Germany, the
readmission policy was  primarily introduced with the aim
of avoiding unintended consequences of the introduction
of DRG-based payment. It focuses on readmissions of indi-
vidual patients within a certain time period that (often)
depends on the clinical condition of patients; and hospitals
receive only one DRG-based payment for both the initial
and the re-admission. By contrast, the introduction of read-
mission policies in Denmark, England and the US was  more
related to aims of quality improvement.
It is a limitation of this study that we are not able to
provide speciﬁc recommendations to policymakers wish-
ing to reduce the number of unplanned readmissions. This
is due to the fact that no evaluations of the effects of
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national readmission policies on reducing readmissions are
currently available. The application part of the paper is
limited by the fact that we consider the readmission poli-
cies of four countries only. While other countries might
have policies that can serve as further inspiration, a survey
of all countries’ readmission policies is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Our ﬁndings have important implications for policy
makers as they allow the identiﬁcation of advantages
and disadvantages of alternative approaches. In particu-
lar, advantages and disadvantages are evident in relation to
three dimensions of our roadmap: [1] the focus of the pol-
icy on individual patients vs. readmission rates [2], the time
period used for deﬁning readmissions [3], the deﬁnition
of the benchmark for determining avoidable readmissions,
and [4] the use of ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial incentives as
for managing readmissions.
4.1. The focus of the policy
A policy focussing on individual patients – as is the case
in Germany – has the advantage that it directs attention
of hospitals to each individual patient. When combined
with ﬁnancial incentives, such a policy basically intro-
duces a “warranty” of hospitals for treated patients [3].
Consequently, all hospitals have interest in reducing read-
missions – not only those with readmission rates above a
certain threshold. However, this approach can unintend-
edly penalise hospitals serving local communities where
factors out of the hospitals control lead to above average
readmission rates. To avoid such penalties, payment rates
should ideally be determined based on historical local cost
data and include an adjustment for the average cost of and
probability of readmissions net a monetary reduction to
provide incentives for reducing readmissions [3].
In Germany, DRG-based payment rates are calculated
based on average costs of patients in a sample of Ger-
man  hospitals [38]. During payment rate calculation, the
readmission rule of merging readmissions with initial
admissions is applied; and calculated rates, therefore,
include costs of the average proportion of readmitted
patients in these hospitals. As such, this approach may
penalise hospitals in communities at high risk of readmis-
sion. In countries, such as England and the US, where cost
data is available from all hospitals, payment rates could
be adjusted to reﬂect the local proportion of readmissions
to avoid penalising hospitals in communities at high risk
of unavoidable readmissions. In addition, as in England,
withheld payments from readmissions may  be invested in
post-discharge initiatives to avoid future readmissions.
Countries focusing on readmission rates have the possi-
bility to explicitly adjust for risk factors that they consider
to cause higher rates of unavoidable readmissions. How-
ever, as will be discussed below (see Section 4.3), it is
difﬁcult to exactly determine which factors should be con-
trolled for and which not.
4.2. The time period deﬁning readmissions
In Denmark, England and the US, readmission poli-
cies focus on readmissions occurring within 28–30 days of
discharge. However, the rationale for focusing on readmis-
sions within this period relies on little empirical evidence
[39]. On the one hand, if the aim of monitoring readmis-
sions is to support clinical quality development, longer
follow-ups may  be appropriate. On the other hand, if the
aim is to hold hospitals accountable for readmissions that
would be avoidable by a change in hospital behaviour a
shorter time frame may  be desirable.
Chambers and Clarke [40] analysed unplanned readmis-
sions occurring between 1 and 104 days after discharge
in acute hospitals in three districts in a region of England
in general medicine, general surgery, gynaecology, trauma
and orthopaedics, and geriatrics. Across all specialities they
found a peak in readmissions at 0–6 days after discharge,
which levelled off after 28 days. In addition, Clarke [41]
found that readmissions occurring within 0–6 days from
discharge were statistically signiﬁcantly more likely to
be avoidable than readmissions occurring within 21–27
days.
More recently, Walraven et al. assessed the avoidabil-
ity of readmissions of unplanned readmissions from 11
hospitals in Ontario [42]. They conﬁrmed the ﬁndings
of Chambers and Clarke, estimating that the odds of a
readmission being classiﬁed avoidable decreased by 32%
per month after discharge. Of the readmissions occurring
within 4 days of discharge, 22% were classiﬁed as avoid-
able, compared to 6% of readmissions occurring more than
135 days after discharge. Results are conﬁrmed in reviews
[43,44].
In view of these ﬁndings, a policy that uses a condi-
tion speciﬁc time threshold for identifying readmissions
might be preferable. Germany is the only country, where
the DRG speciﬁc upper length of stay threshold is used to
identify readmissions. DRGs for highly complex cases usu-
ally have a long upper length of stay threshold whereas
DRGs for less complex cases have a short length of stay
threshold.
4.3. The benchmark determining avoidability
In England and the US, where ﬁnancial incentives target
avoidable readmissions, national approaches differ greatly
in how they translate the concept of avoidability into an
administrative rule. The problem is that hospitals should
– in theory – be held responsible only for those readmis-
sions that can be affected by changes in hospital behaviour
[31,43].
The US policy of calculating an expected risk-adjusted
readmission rate as the benchmark for hospitals beyond
which readmissions are considered as avoidable has the
advantage of being highly transparent and standardised
across all hospitals in the country. The risk-adjustment for-
mula is published by the CMS  implying that researchers
and stakeholders can challenge the existing methodol-
ogy. The methodology has been subject of considerable
debate, and has been criticised amongst others for
not taking patients’ socioeconomic status into account
[45].
In fact, this debate points to a general problem of risk
adjustment, which is that it can be difﬁcult to select appro-
priate factors to be included in a risk-adjustment formula
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because these factors depend on the aim of the policy
[46]. If the aim of a readmission policy is to hold hospi-
tals accountable for readmissions and it is believed that
for example age inﬂuences readmission rates in a way
hospitals cannot affect, age should be included in the risk-
adjustment formula. On the other hand, if it is thought
that hospitals can inﬂuence elderly patients’ readmission
rates for example by special discharge programmes for the
elderly, age may  not be considered a “risk” but rather an
indicator for the hospitals to use for identifying patients
with special needs. The same arguments apply also for
socioeconomic status. On the one hand, there are good
reasons to adjust for socioeconomic variables because
patients living in poorer neighbourhoods have been found
to have higher readmission rates since the population in
these areas may  be sicker or have more severe conditions
[47,48]. However, including socioeconomic variables in a
risk-adjustment formula would implicitly mean that it was
acceptable for hospitals located in poorer areas to have
more readmission.
The English payment policy has the advantage that
it avoids having to deﬁne a statistical risk-adjustment
methodology because it relies on local clinical reviews of
readmissions in a speciﬁed time period. Given the difﬁ-
culty of selecting appropriate variables for risk-adjustment,
a clinical approach to identifying ‘avoidable’ readmissions
has some advantages. In addition, a local review of indi-
vidual cases who were readmitted can be very useful also
for the identiﬁcation of context speciﬁc factors that led to
the readmission of these patients. However, an important
problem of the individual case approach is that it is very
intransparent. The criteria determining whether a readmis-
sion is deemed avoidable may  be open for interpretation,
and this can create variations due to local differences in
bargaining power between payers and providers. Further-
more, seasonal patterns in readmissions are not accounted
for in England because the clinical review must be held dur-
ing the ﬁrst 3 months of the year. An alternative would be
to base the review on a sample of readmissions drawn from
across the full previous year when the threshold is set.
4.4. Financial versus non-ﬁnancial incentives for
performance
In theory, the public reporting of readmission rates
reduces asymmetry of information and enables consumer
choice and competition between providers. Systematic
reviews [32,34] have found little evidence that patients or
purchasers pay much attention to publicly reported quality
metrics in general, but found some evidence that hospitals
do react to the publication of quality indicators, possi-
bly because due to an expectation about a quality elastic
demand curve.
The evidence for the effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives
in the form of pay for performance programmes is equally
scant [49]. More research has been called for into whether
using penalties rather than bonuses for incentivizing hos-
pitals is more effective [50].
There is thus no strong evidence base for recommen-
ding ﬁnancial incentives over non-ﬁnancial incentives for
reducing readmissions.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we  have suggested a roadmap for system-
atically comparing readmission policies across countries.
An application of the roadmap to readmission policies in
Denmark, England, Germany, and the US (Medicare IPPS)
has highlighted advantages and disadvantages of alterna-
tive approaches.
Policy makers might want to consider whether partic-
ular elements of readmission policies in other countries
could be adjusted to their national context in order to
improve their own national readmission policy. For exam-
ple, it might be attractive for England and the US to explore
the possibility of introducing a “warranty” – similar as
in Germany – and to hold hospitals accountable for indi-
vidual patients, all while avoiding the problems of the
German policy, where the unavailability of cost data from
all hospitals means that payment rates are not adjusted
to reﬂect local factors that may  justiﬁably inﬂuence read-
mission rates. Also the German approach of deﬁning DRG
speciﬁc time thresholds for readmissions provides an inter-
esting example of how readmission policies can move
beyond a random 28 or 30 day readmission threshold.
On the other hand, transparency could be considerably
improved in Germany by following the examples of other
countries and making information on risk-adjusted read-
mission rates publicly available – possibly combined with
information on unavoidable readmissions based on a local
clinical review.
Future studies could draw on our roadmap to identify
how parameters of different national policies vary across
other countries and how these variations may be associated
with better results in terms of reducing hospital readmis-
sions.
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